The US administration ties the prices it pays for medicines to those paid abroad and justifies this ‘most-favoured-nation’ policy with the claim that Americans subsidise low prices in Europe. This column describes how the available evidence shows that most-favoured nation risks imposing substantial costs on European health systems for a modest American gain. Moreover, its justification cannot be sustained: lower European prices do not cause higher American ones, and American prices are no benchmark for a fair contribution to innovation. Europe should respond as a Union, close its gap in capital and scale, and coordinate targeted incentives at EU level.
In 2025, the US president signed an executive order on ‘most-favoured-nation’ (MFN) prices, asserting that Americans “should not be forced to subsidize low-cost prescription drugs and biologics in other developed countries” (Executive Office of the President 2025). MFN pricing ties the price the US pays to the prices paid in other wealthy countries. The administration has backed up its policy by signing MFN agreements with 26 manufacturers. The model through which these prices are applied in Medicaid, the public insurance programme for low-income Americans, takes the second-lowest net price in a basket of eight reference countries, four of them EU member states (CMS 2026). In June 2026, the US Trade Representative opened a section 301 investigation, a trade-law procedure that can end in tariffs, into Germany’s “persistent underpayment” for innovative medicines (USTR 2026).
The justification is a moral one: Europe, it is said, enjoys the fruits of innovation without paying its fair share. The American argument combines a complaint (Americans pay more because Europeans pay less), a charge (Europe does not pay its fair share), and a remedy (MFN pricing). In a recent paper (Vandenbroucke and Ghéquière 2026), we start with the remedy, because that is where the stakes for Europe lie, and then ask whether the complaint and the charge can be sustained.
The appeal of MFN is straightforward: if Americans could obtain medicines at European prices, they would pay much less. In practice, it works differently. Once the American price is capped by the European one, a lower price in a small European country costs the manufacturer revenue on the much larger American market. It has every reason to refuse. The European purchaser can still walk away, but that threat loses much of its weight. The agreements make matters worse: the Lilly agreement allows the company to omit a price from a reference country by withdrawing from that market, thereby creating an incentive to cease supplying foreign markets to protect the American price (HHS and Eli Lilly 2026).
Dubois et al. (2022) model exactly this situation. Prices in the reference countries roughly triple, while American prices fall by 7.5% to 15%, and the smaller the country, the heavier the adjustment. Combined industry profits change little; most of the effect is a redistribution of payments between countries. The budgetary consequences for European health systems would be huge: in the model, spending on patented medicines in a reference country rises by about 40%. If the money cannot be found, access itself suffers, and with it the solidarity on which universal insurance rests. MFN thus risks imposing substantial, possibly disruptive, costs on European health systems for a modest American gain. Would that sacrifice be justified? Only if the complaint and the charge are well-founded.
Americans do pay much more for brand-name originator medicines – roughly three times the price in other OECD countries, after rebates (Mulcahy et al. 2024). But in the standard analysis of a firm selling in separate markets, the research cost is sunk once prices are set, and the firm charges the profit-maximising price in each market given demand there. A lower European price may reduce expected returns and hence research (Acemoglu and Linn 2004, Dubois et al. 2015); it does not by itself raise the American price.
American prices reflect American institutions. A manufacturer sets its own price the moment a medicine is approved; no assessment of added therapeutic value or cost-effectiveness precedes that price. Purchasing is fragmented between insurers, employers and public programmes, so no single buyer negotiates on behalf of the whole population, and the public programmes have little room to say no (Kyle 2025). European payers work the other way round: universal coverage, health technology assessment that weighs what a medicine adds against its cost, and the possibility to refuse reimbursement when the added value does not justify the price. A genuine causal link between European and American prices arises only when policy creates one, through international reference pricing. That is precisely what MFN does.
The charge is normative: that Europe takes unfair advantage of a burden Americans deliberately carry. The data show that Europe contributes to innovation, albeit less than the US: other OECD countries pay on average 43% of the US price for branded medicines, well above production costs, and account for about a third of global contributions (Frech et al. 2026). Lower European prices also come with later access: firms navigate a tangle of prices, market sizes and reference rules, launching first where prices are high and later, or not at all, where they are low (Dubois 2026). Frech et al. nevertheless find substantial free riding, because they postulate that American profit levels are closer to the efficient level. Ho and Pakes (2024) likewise compute a single international price that keeps total industry profits at today’s level. Both benchmarks treat present payments, driven by American prices, as the right ones. That is an assumption which can be challenged.
We propose a different standard, drawing on the philosopher Ronald Dworkin (1993). Dworkin rejects the popular intuition that health has no price: a society also needs schools and roads, and no society spends on health care until an extra euro buys no health at all. A decision on what society is willing to pay for a treatment is fair when it is taken collectively, with the best available knowledge, against the background of a fair distribution of resources, and when nobody’s access to insurance depends on their own health risks. Since the prices negotiated today affect the treatments of tomorrow, a fair choice must also provide for future patients. Europe meets that standard better than the US does. Its universal compulsory insurance and collective negotiations based on health technology assessment come closer to Dworkin’s conditions than the American system, with its vast inequalities in access. And what Europe pays provides for future patients in its own right: Dubois (2025a) finds that both American and European revenue encourage new drug registrations, and that European firms respond slightly more to European revenue. It is therefore difficult to maintain that Europe takes unfair advantage of American payments. It spends less on medicines because it has made a different choice. That does not mean that Europe spends enough; what our societies need requires an assessment in its own right, not a level inferred from American prices.
Dubois (2025b) calls for the international coordination of policies that have an impact on pharmaceutical innovation since it is a global public good, financed through national pricing decisions. He also warns that if Europe keeps negotiating as 27 separate payers, the price of innovative medicines “risks being set, de facto, in Washington”, and he pleads for a single European negotiation on innovative medicines (Dubois 2026). We agree with the diagnosis and, as far as the long run is concerned, also with the remedy. However, such a true European framework does not yet exist, and an adequate response to MFN and the American argument is urgent. In the short term, three things can be done.
First, Europe should defend its model of universal access and evidence-based, negotiated prices as a Union, not member state by member state. Pricing and reimbursement are national competences, but trade policy belongs to the Union, and a member state cannot answer trade pressure against its health policy with trade measures of its own. The Union has an instrument designed for this situation, the anti-coercion instrument, a 2023 regulation that allows the Union to answer third countries that use trade threats to force policy changes (Regulation (EU) 2023/2675).1 Opening an investigation would already have an effect: member states could hardly strike separate deals with the Trade Representative while it runs, and Washington would know that threatening member states for the way they organise their health care is answered by Brussels. The Commission should also make clear that new section 301 tariffs would come on top of the 15% ceiling agreed at Turnberry, and that it would then suspend the Union’s concessions.
Second, Europe should act where it actually loses innovation: between discovery and development, where promising companies lack capital and scale. Health-biotech venture funding in the Union between 2015 and mid-2025 was about €25 billion, against €219 billion in the United States (European Commission 2025). The Commission’s proposed Biotech Act, with new investment instruments alongside the European Investment Bank and faster authorisation of clinical trials, aims at the right target. Whether it is big enough is a fair question.
Third, prices can also support innovation, on one condition: that they are targeted at research and production in Europe, within a European framework. A reward tied to what a firm does in Europe is a far more precise instrument than a general price rise. The Critical Medicines Act, EU legislation agreed in May 2026, already obliges purchasers to favour production in the Union for critical medicines, and France and Germany are now applying the same logic to innovative medicines, each on its own. Such national schemes distort the internal market, since smaller member states can never match the incentives of larger ones. The answer is a European framework: common definitions of what counts as research and production in the Union, credit for activity anywhere in the Union, and the Commission’s control of state aid as the guardian.
Source: cepr.org
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